The position of the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), since the beginning of February 2021, the Myanmar coup has been different compared to the rest of the Ethnic Armed Groups. ULA/AA has firmly expressed that it shall not allow anti-coup movement activities in Rakhine State. With their history with the Tatmadaw, including the travesty surrounding the wars between the Tatmadaw and the AA and the Rohingya Crisis, many observers would have expected that they would immediately jump on the bandwagon to join the anti-coup cause. Yet, to some extent, they appeared unbothered and unaffected by the political crisis. This paper attempts to examine the factors behind Rakhine’s indifference to the coup, including the rise and popularity of ULA/AA’s political aspirations. I argue that such decision by the ULA/AA are founded upon their political aspirations to differentiate themselves from developments “on the mainland,” born out of history and strengthened by political-economic condition and growing nationalist sentiments inside the region of Rakhine, which has built their affinity for status quo amidst the increasingly complex situation. Sooner or later, however, the ULA/AA may also need to decide their position amidst the political struggle to decide Myanmar’s future in the Capital if they truly wish to secure the best outcome for their own political aspirations.